der in die Binsen gegangene Brady-Argy-2010-Swap

Autor: der kleine Prinz Datum: Heute, 14:45

Urteil des Second Circuit vom 20.07.2011, welches eine Teilnahme der Brady Bonds am 2010-Umtausch verhinderte: Zitat: We now hold that CVI is entitled to maintain its attachments even though a quirk of the bonds’ Collateral Pledge Agreement means that the attachments will effectively block a proposed exchange between Argentina and the holders of the bonds. We therefore reverse the district court’s orders that modified the attachments to permit the exchange. Argentinien wollte das "Collateral Pledge Agreement" zu Gunsten der Brady-Bond-Besitzer modifizieren, sodass der "Collateral Agent" die Sicherheiten ("Collateral") verwerten und direkt an die Brady-Bond-Besitzer auszahlen konnte. In Section 6.01 ist leider vereinbart, dass im Falle eines Umtausch/Rückkaufs die Sicherheiten an Argentinien gehen: Zitat: In laymen’s terms, a pre-2023 exchange lifts the lien in favor of the Brady bondholders and returns the collateral to Argentina. Richter Griesa (erste Instanz) hat der Modifikation zugestimmt, die zweite Instanz leider nicht. Fazit der zweiten Instanz: Die Nicht-Brady-Holdouts (hier CVI) haben zwar das Recht, einen Brady-Umtausch vor 2023 zu verhindern (weil Section 6.01 "schlampig" formuliert ist), haben aber keinen Zugriff auf die Sicherheiten und die 100%-Tilgung am 31.03.2023: Zitat: On the maturity date in 2023, the Agreement provides that either (a) Argentina will repay the holders of the Brady bonds, or (b) the Collateral Agent will give the collateral to the bondholders through their agent. ... Argentina presents several arguments that the exchange would not infringe on CVI’s attachments, none prevailing. It primarily relies on the senior security interest in the collateral held by the Federal Reserve on behalf of the Brady bondholders. See Collateral Pledge Agreement §§ 2.01, 9.05. CVI does not dispute the seniority of that security interest, which both makes it impossible (or at least pointless) for CVI to foreclose on the collateral and means that CVI cannot stop the collateral from going to the Brady bondholders if Argentina does not pay up in 2023, as Section 3.04 provides. ... The [brady] bondholders will get no less than they originally bargained for; they lose only their flexibility to arrange a different deal. It is unfortunate, from their perspective, that CVI gets to play the role of the spoiler and to try to extract concessions from Argentina at their expense. But that is just a consequence of CVI’s exercising the rights to which it is entitled under New York law, as recognized in our prior opinion. If the bondholders have liquidity needs that will not permit them to wait until 2023 for their collateral, they may sell their bonds in the secondary market for distressed debt (a market with which many players here are, no doubt, already familiar).