Debt Coverage:
Daily Caller: “I am not a ‘vulture’”
Social Science Research Network: “The Problem of Holdout Creditors in Eurozone Sovereign Debt Restructurings”
Argentine Economy:
Reuters: “UPDATE 2-Argentina unemployment steady despite slowdown-president”
The Wall Street Journal: “Argentina's Black-Market Peso Slides; Stocks Little Changed”
Global Relations:
UPI: “Israel to reprimand Argentina in bombing”
AFP: “Jews reject Argentina-Iran deal on bombing probe”
The Guardian: “Falkland Islands liquid gas find commercially viable say explorers”
Buenos Aires Herald: “CELAC leaders support Argentine claims”
MercoPress: “UK wants to control South Atlantic access and resources, claims Argentina”
MercoPress: “Are Falkland Islanders the Mapuches of the South Atlantic?”
The Daily Caller
Monday, January 28, 2013
By Maria Teresa Munoz
The U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals will soon hear arguments in a legal battle that has been described in the media as “the landmark sovereign debt default case of the century”: NML v. Argentina. The court will determine — once and for all — whether Cristina Kirchner’s government must honor its promises to “international creditors,” i.e., the institutional holdout investors. The case, it is said, will set “an important legal precedent,” upon which might rest the future of the secondary debt market.
These are all true statements, and speak to why this case has earned the attention of the world. But, in my kitchen in Buenos Aires — and in tens of thousands of homes across Argentina, Europe, and North America — individual holdout investors like myself also await judgment. We look forward to the day that justice will be done; that our dignity — and our savings — will be restored; that 12 years of government stonewalling will have come to an end, and with them, perhaps, the suffering of those who have been held captive to our government’s refusal to honor its obligations to its citizens.
Social Science Research Network
Tuesday, January 22, 2013
By Lee Buchheit, Mitu Gulati and Ignacio Tirado
Abstract:
The Eurozone official sector has declared that the belated restructuring of Greek bonds held by private sector creditors in 2012 was a “unique and exceptional” event, never, ever to be repeated in any other Eurozone country. Maybe so. But if this assurance proves in time to be as fragile as the official sector’s prior pronouncements on the subject of “private sector involvement” in Eurozone sovereign debt problems, any future Eurozone debt restructuring will be surely plagued by the problem of non-participating creditors --- holdouts. Indeed, it is the undisguised fear of holdouts and the prospect of a messy, Argentine-style debt restructuring in the belly of Europe that has been one of the principal motivations for the official sector’s willingness to use its taxpayer money to repay, in full and on time, all of the private sector creditors of Eurozone countries receiving bailouts (the belated Greek restructuring being the sole exception).
This article argues that a simple amendment of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (the Eurozone’s new bailout facility) could immunize within the confines of the Eurozone the assets of a Eurozone country receiving ESM bailout assistance from attachment by litigious holdout creditors. By thus increasing the difficulties that holdouts would face in enforcing court judgments against a debtor country, the objective of the amendment is to deflate creditor expectations that staying out of an ESM-supported sovereign debt restructuring will lead to a preferential recovery for the holdouts.
The Eurozone official sector has declared that the belated restructuring of Greek bonds held by private sector creditors in 2012 was a “unique and exceptional” event, never, ever to be repeated in any other Eurozone country. Maybe so. But if this assurance proves in time to be as fragile as the official sector’s prior pronouncements on the subject of “private sector involvement” in Eurozone sovereign debt problems, any future Eurozone debt restructuring will be surely plagued by the problem of non-participating creditors --- holdouts. Indeed, it is the undisguised fear of holdouts and the prospect of a messy, Argentine-style debt restructuring in the belly of Europe that has been one of the principal motivations for the official sector’s willingness to use its taxpayer money to repay, in full and on time, all of the private sector creditors of Eurozone countries receiving bailouts (the belated Greek restructuring being the sole exception).
This article argues that a simple amendment of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (the Eurozone’s new bailout facility) could immunize within the confines of the Eurozone the assets of a Eurozone country receiving ESM bailout assistance from attachment by litigious holdout creditors. By thus increasing the difficulties that holdouts would face in enforcing court judgments against a debtor country, the objective of the amendment is to deflate creditor expectations that staying out of an ESM-supported sovereign debt restructuring will lead to a preferential recovery for the holdouts.
Reuters
Monday, January 28, 2013
BUENOS AIRES, Jan 28 (Reuters) - Argentina's unemployment rate was 6.9 percent in the fourth quarter, up just slightly from a year earlier even though economic growth slowed sharply, President Cristina Fernandez said on Monday.
In the fourth quarter of 2011, the jobless rate was 6.7 percent, according to the INDEC statistics institute.
"We are nearly at the same level of record unemployment that we reached in the last quarter of 2011," Fernandez said during a live televised speech.
The Wall Street Journal
Monday, January 28, 2013
By Taos Turner
BUENOS AIRES--Argentina's black-market peso opened the week by weakening against the U.S. dollar, continuing a trend that began last month as tourists moved en masse to buy dollars.
The black-market peso closed at ARS7.62 to the dollar, according to the financial daily El Cronista.
Argentina strictly rations the sale of dollars and other currencies, forcing many people into the black market if they really need other currencies for travel or to save.
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