Gesamtzahl der Seitenaufrufe

Donnerstag, 31. Oktober 2013

Zinskomponente beim Par-Tausch....??

1,2% Zins auf Parbonds vom 31.12.2003 bis 31.03.2009 (5,25 Jahre) plus 2,26% Zins auf Parbonds für 4,5 Jahre bis 30.09.2013 macht 16,47%.
1,2% x 5,25 + 2,26 x 4,5 = 16,47
Bis 2019 bleibt die Verzinsung der Parbonds 2,26% p.a.
Bei den Discounts kommt es so ähnlich heraus, aber etwas komplizierter zu rechnen.

Elliot Management hopeful a 'consensual resolution' is achieved with Argentina

Thursday, October 31, 2013

Elliot Management hopeful a 'consensual resolution' is achieved with Argentina

In a letter to investors dated October 28, Elliott Management said it remained hopeful that a "consensual resolution" can be achieved with Argentina regarding the hedge funds dispute.
Elliott, which ranks among the industry's most enduring funds, having opened in 1977 with $1 million in assets, tried to force Argentina to make full payment on bonds it bought more than a decade ago.
In the same 13-page letter to report its quarterly numbers, the firm said the US Federal Reserve'seasy money policies have distorted the economy and created big risks for markets and investors alike, prompting the hedge fund firm to add to long gold options to protect against inflation.
It called the US government "dysfunctional" only days after a paralyzing government shutdown, and said the current situation in Washington cannot be beneficial for financial markets or investors.
To protect against future crises, the firm, which is run by Paul Singer, said it has put money into activist strategies where the outcomes and stock movements may be less correlated to market movements.
Elliott's flagship Elliott Associates fund gained 3.8 percent during the quarter and is up 9.3 percent for the first nine months of the year, according to the letter. Elliott International, the firm's offshore fund, is up 9.0 percent through the end of September, also beating the average hedge fund's 5.5 percent gain.
The broader stock market, however, rose much more over that period, with the Standard & Poor's 500 index gaining 19.8 percent in the first nine months of 2013.
Furthermore, the firm takes swipes at US lawmakers and Europe, saying there has been little progress in overhauling the "unsustainable structure of the European Union."
US and European activist equity and event-driven positions make sense now, Elliott Management said, because this strategy allows investors to be less influenced by "governmental manipulations."
"Not only does the activist component serve to create value and protect capital, but it also gives us a chance to dig ourselves out of mistakes or bad luck," the letter said.
While risk-taking at financial institutions has declined since the financial crisis and balance sheets show that US and European banks are solvent, Elliott worries that leverage is still too high and transparency is not what it should be.
"The really bad news is that the 'hair trigger' aspect of modern global trading markets is just getting more intense," the letter said.
Elliott Management also said the US Federal Reserve's quantitative easing policy has caused stocks to rise, fueling a form of inflation. In the portfolio, Elliott is adding to its bullish gold option holdings that aim for limited downside risk with a large upside potential, saying it still feels that fundamentals are "uniquely positive for gold."
Fellow hedge fund manager John Paulson, whose gold fund has been hit by heavy losses this year, has also stuck by his view that inflation will rebound at some point and that his holdings will pay off then.
Elliott also said it believes that shares of energy group Hess Corp. continue to trade substantially below intrinsic value, and said it looks forward to the corporate restructuring now under way. The stock has climbed 52 percent this year.
Elliott Management said it is nearly fully invested and "able to add to the firm's capital."

ich glaube das interessiert insbesonder die geprellten Argy-Kläger....

Sparkline 289,120

Donnerstag, 31. Oktober 2013

wer fährt (fliegt) mit nach New York.............?

LAST CHANCE TO REGISTER!!
EMTA is pleased to present "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Private Sector Reaction to Current Proposals".
This Special Seminar will be held on Tuesday, November 5, 2013, at EMTA’s offices at 360 Madison Avenue, 17th Floor, on 45th Street between Madison and 5th Aves., in New York City, beginning at 11:45 a.m., scheduled to end at 2:15 p.m., and a light lunch will be provided.
After the IMF’s withdrawal of its proposal a decade ago for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM), and the adoption of the IIF’s Principles of Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring and inclusion of collective action clauses (CACs) in EM bond issues, there have been various official sector and academic concerns about the existing mechanisms for restructuring sovereign bonds, particularly in response to developments in the European sovereign debt markets and pending litigation against Argentina.
On October 16, EMTA presented a panel of sovereign debt experts, who described a variety of current proposals, including those from the IMF, to reform aspects of the international architecture for restructuring sovereign bonds.
Today’s panel of leading private sector practitioners will provide their own views on the current sovereign debt restructuring architecture and on the various proposals to reform it.
Speakers will include:
Charles Blitzer (Blitzer Consulting) – Moderator
Tim DeSieno (Bingham McCutchen)
Gerardo Rodriguez (BlackRock)
Jay Newman (Elliott Management Corporation)
Rashique Rahman (Morgan Stanley)
Support for this event provided by Bingham McCutchen and Morgan Stanley.
This Special Seminar is the second in a three-part EMTA series of panels on sovereign debt, the international architecture to restructure it and proposed reforms.  Our third panel on December 18 will endeavor to summarize the official sector and private sector positions and articulate a sensible path forward.
Attendance
Registration fee for EMTA members is US$75 / Non-members is US$495 / Closed to the Press.
Registration
To register, please CLICK HERE if you have previously registered for an EMTA event or you are an EMTA member with login credentials.

Cancellation
Cancellations must be received by 11:45 a.m. (NY time), Monday, November 4, 2013, or you will be charged the full amount. Substitute delegates may be sent at no additional charge. Please contact Suzette Ortiz at sortiz@emta.org for any matters related to registration.
For more information on non-registration matters, please contact Aviva Werner at EMTA at +1 (646) 289-5412 or by email atawerner@emta.org.
EMTA offers a wide range of Emerging Markets information. Please see our website at: http://www.emta.org.


This e-mail was sent from EMTA, Trade Association For The Emerging Markets (sortiz@emta.org) to rolfjkoch@web.de.

Kommentare:

  1. Was willst du denn in USA ? Da verstehst du doch eh nichts.
    Und die Reisekosten müsste Mutti Sylvia dir doch eh wieder aus ihrem Strickgeld bezahlen.
    Antworten
    1. da ich ohnehin nach New York muss um diverse deutsche Argentinienurteile in die Zahlungsschlange nach Elliott/Singer/NML einzureihen ist es nicht so wichtig ob ich was verstehe....was ich verstehe, ist, das es Geld gibt

      wer näheres wissen will:

      rolfjkoch@web.de
      06151 14 77 94
    2. Der Kommentar wurde von einem Blog-Administrator entfernt.
  2. Der Kommentar wurde von einem Blog-Administrator entfernt.
    AntwortenLöschen
  3. In die Zahlungsschlange einreihen ?
    Du elender alter Wichtigmacher. Immer wieder produzierst du dich und erzählst den Leuten deinen Stuss.
    Da dir ja die ABDRECO GmbH und ihre stillen Gesellschafter doch angeblich so am herzen liegen, wirst du dann doch bestimmt auch deren Urteil einreihen, nicht wahr ?
  4. Tja, in der Tat erstaunlich, dass der gute Rolf Koch und sein Sohn als Mitgesellschafter diese Infos der ABDRECO und damit auch den stillen Gesellschaftern vorenthält.

Lead Articles: Clarin: “Reserves fall another US$180 million” La Nacion: “By a nose, the IADB gave the country a credit” La Nacion: “Economists do not predict changes in economic policy until 2015”

Clarin
Reserves fall another US$180 million
 
Thursday, October 31, 2013
 
The Central Bank reported last night that the fall in the reserves is not slowing down.  It computed US$33.534 billion, US$180 million less than on Monday.  The reasons for the drop obey the increasing exit of dollars needed for fuel imports and from spending by Argentine tourists abroad.  
 
Precisely, as the importation of oil and its derivatives cannot be halted, what everyone in the market is waiting for is the announcement of new restrictions on the use of dollars by the general public.  And eyes are pointed at the AFIP.  It is expected that before the end of the year, a new ta will be implemented on credit card consumption, which would accentuate the “tourist dollar” market, arising from adding the AFIP tax, which is 20% today, to the official dollar rate.
 
The proximity of summer vacations indicates that the official decision shouldn’t take long to appear.  That is, if there is not a turn to a more general measure, like a straight and full split currency exchange rate system.
 
The fall in reserves is deeper, but broken up because in September some US$1.5 billion entered in the form of a short-term loan.  It was given by a European Central Bank that the BCRA doesn’t want to name over issues of confidentiality.  In truth, it’s a loan guaranteed by the Central Bank reserves themselves, deposited in the Bank of Basel.  They are there to be safe from attachments.  But equally, there is not a plan in view to halt the fall of this asset.
 
 
La Nacion
By a nose, the IADB gave the country a credit
 
Thursday, October 31, 2013
 
by Martín Kanenguiser | LA NACION
 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) approved yesterday, by a very narrow voting margin, a new US$300 million credit for Argentina.
 
The vote, once again, was very close due to the decision by most of the European countries and the United States to not support the granting of new loans to the country, a source close to the process in Washington told LA NACION.
 
"Nothing changed,” said the source bluntly with regard to Argentina’s yearning for the United States and other governments to start supporting the country since the announcement of the agreement with a group of companies in order to pay their sentences in the ICSID, the World Bank arbitration tribunal.   
 
Sources from Washington indicated to LA NACION that they are waiting for the country to move forward in paying its debts to analyze a change in position, both in the IADB as well as the World Bank.
 
"There will be no changes until the government complies with all its obligations, both from the ICSID as well as the Paris Club,” they said.
 
In this direction, the government announced that it had already closed a deal with five companies that had won arbitration cases in the ICSID and UNCITRAL (the United Nations tribunal).  They are National Grid, Continental, Vivendi, Azurix and CMS Gas.
 
Resolution 598 of the Economy Ministry, published on the 18th of this month in the Official Bulletin, established the payment of US$501 million to these five foreign companies.
 
The credit approved yesterday by the multinational entity led by Luis Alberto Moreno will serve for the “increasing, the rehabilitation and improvement of roadways, which include actions for improving the conditions of road safety in the region of Norte Grande of Argentina,” it detailed.
 
This IADB credit is part of a US$1.2 billion plan for Argentina this year, according to the plans of the regional bank, in which the United States has 30% of the shares.
 
For its part, Latin America has 53%, while Europe, China and Japan split the rest.  If the outlook doesn’t change in the coming month, it will be difficult to see the World Bank approving some US$3 billion this year as announced by the government.
 
 
La Nacion
Economists do not predict changes in economic policy until 2015
They say that the political cost of some measures is too high, by which they expect the government will tighten the currency clamp and the draining of the reserves will continue
 
Thursday, October 31, 2013
 
by Florencia Donovan  | LA NACION
 
Inflation and the exchange rate gap are only two of the macroeconomic variables that suggest that the model, as it was proposed 10 years ago, has run its course.  However, and even despite Sunday’s election results, economists don’t believe that the government will make changes in economic policy in the next two years; on the contrary, the majority believes that it will seek to control the imbalances by deepening the recipes applied until now.
 
"After 10 years, a government has already given the best of itself.  It’s naïve to think that it can make important changes,” said Guillermo Nielsen, Finance secretary during the presidency of Nestor Kirchner and, in that post, negotiator of the first debt swap of 2005.
 
"Look at what happened with the deepening of the currency exchange and the ridiculousness of the amnesty.  I don’t think that there can be big changes.  The issue these two years (until 2015) is what will happen with the heirs: is there anyone who wants to receive a macro-economy full of time bombs?” asked Nielsen, during a meeting organized by the magazine Bank at the Bolsa de Comercio.
 
The problem, according to Nielsen, is that many of the measures that seem obvious from the macroeconomic view, like the lag in prices relative to some sectors strongly affected by inflation, don’t seem possible from the political point of view.  With inflation that, he said, is at around 30% annual, it’s difficult for example to think of adjustments in power rates of 100%, as are necessary in some cases.
 
Another of the big imbalances that is hitting the government at this time is the drop in reserves in the hands of the Central Bank.  According to Martin Redrado, former BCRA president and current advisor to Sergio Massa, at the start of the year the majority of economists predicted that the reserves would remain stable in 2013, but they will end the year with a drop of US$11 billion.  “The Central Bank cannot put up with a loss of US$1 billion per month,” said Redrado, for whom, however, in this “unending search for dollars” the government “will continue with more of the same.”  “The government will now not be able to use reserves for sustaining growth and will have to protect them.  This is equal to more clamp, more squeeze so that pre-financing for exports come,” he said.
 
Federico Sturzenegger, President of Banco Cuidad and now deputy-elect for the PRO, agreed: “Not much will change.  The most likely is that we will see a stronger clamp, if there is not an interesting investment climate.”
 
But Sturzenegger said he is not concerned over the drainage of the reserves.  For the economist, the problem is not the quality of reserves that a central bank has, but if it is credible or not.  In Argentina, he said, the reserves are 8% of GDP, while in the United States they represent 1%.  “Its credibility emanates from the other side,” said Sturzenegger. "In 2015, whatever the level of reserves, they will go up.  Now, if a government without credibility like the current one releases the clamp it’s another slogan,” he said.  
 
Only the BCRA former president and current director of Banco Hipotecario, Mario Blejer, ventured to say that the government is giving signals of having taken note of the need for a change.  “To resume relations with the IMF and the Paris Club… I believe that there will be movements in that direction to untie the situation of the international market.   In that sense, the problem of the reserves doesn’t worry by too much,” he said.
 

Comparison of Greek and Argentinian Bond Restructuring Analysis May 26 2010, 06:26 | about: NBG

In order to assess the impact of sovereign debt restructuring on the market prices of the sovereign bonds that undergo restructuring (haircut in the principal amount or maturity extension), we retrieved price data of the Argentinean bonds that underwent restructuring in 2005. The sovereign debt restructuring in the case of Argentina was a combination of maturity extension and principal haircut. Argentina defaulted on its international debt in November 2001 after a failed attempt to restructure the debt. The markets priced in the risk of a substantial haircut around this time and the bond prices plummeted sharply. We at BoomBustBlog are in the habit of taking market prices seriously, and have factored historical market reactions into our analysis in calculating prospective price action in distressed and soon to be Sovereign debt. Before moving on, it is highly recommended that readers review our haircut analysis for Greece (“With the Euro Disintegrating, You Can Calculate Your Haircuts Here”) and our more likely to occur restructuring analysis for the same (What is the Most Likely Scenario in the Greek Debt Fiasco? Restructuring Via Extension of Maturity Dates).
The restructuring of the Argentina debt in default was occurred in 2005 when the government offered new bonds in exchange of old securities. The government gave the option of either accepting A) a par bond with no haircut in the principal amount but substantially lower coupon and longer maturity or accept B) a discount bond with a haircut in principal amount to the extent of 66.3% but relatively better coupon rate and shorter maturity than in case of Par bond. If the bondholder accepted A), for each unit of bond, one unit of Par bond will be allotted. If the bondholder accepted B), for each unit of bond, 0.33 unit of Discount Bond will be allotted. The loss to the creditor, which is decline in the NPV of the cash flows, was nearly the same in both cases as the lower principal amount in Option B was offset by better coupon rate and shorter maturity. The price of the par bond in the market and the price of the discount bond multiplied by the exchange ratio (real price to the bond holder) were largely the same when they were listed in the market in 2005.
The IMF estimated the average haircut (decline in the net present value of the bond) was on an average 75% and the market priced in most of this haircut before the actual restructuring in Feb 2005. The prices of the bond in default declined nearly 65% between Feb 2001 and Feb 2005.
One should keep these figures in mind, for in the blog post “How Greece Killed Its Own Banks!I ran through a much, much more optimistic scenario that wiped out ALL of the equity of the big Greek banks. Remember, the Greek government stuffed these banks to the gills with Greek bonds in order to created the perception of a market for them. As excerpeted…
Well, the answer is…. Insolvency! The gorging on quickly to be devalued debt was the absolutely last thing the Greek banks needed as they were suffering from a classic run on the bank due to deposits being pulled out at a record pace. So assuming the aforementioned drain on liquidity from a bank run (mitigated in part or in full by support from the ECB), imagine what happens when a very significant portion of your bond portfolio performs as follows (please note that these numbers were drawn before the bond market route of the 27th)…
image001
The same hypothetical leveraged positions expressed as a percentage gain or loss…
image003
When I first started writing this post this morning, the only other bond markets getting hit were Portugal’s. After the aforementioned downgraded, I would assume we can expect significantly more activity. As you can, those holding these bonds on a leveraged basis (basically any bank that holds the bonds) has gotten literally toasted. We have discovered several entities that are flushed with sovereign debt and I am turning significantly more bearish against them. Subscribers, please reference the following:
To date, my work both free and particularly the subscription work, has shown significant returns. I am quite confident that the thesis behind the Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis research is still quite valid and has a very long run ahead of it. Let’s look at one of the main Greek bank shorts that we went bearish on in January:
nbg since research
Now, referencing the bond price charts below as well as the spreadsheet data containing sovereign debt restructuring in Argentina, we get…
The price of the bond that went under restructuring and was exchanged for the Par bond in 2005.
image001
Price of the bond that went under restructuring and was exchanged for the Discount bond
image003
With this quick historical primer still fresh in our heads, let’s revisit ourGreek, Spanish, and Italian banking analyses (the green sidebar to the right), many of which are trying to push the 400% mark in terms of returns if one purchased OTM options at the time of the research release. It may be worthwhile to review the Sovereign debt exposure of Insurers and Reinsurers as well.
We may very well get a bear market rally or two that may pop prices, but from a fundamental perspective, I do not see how significantly more pain is not to come out of this debt fiasco. The only question is who’s next. We feel we have answered that question is sufficient detail through ourSovereign Contagion Model. Thus far, it has been right on the money for 5 months straight!
Disclosure: Short greek banks